IMPORTANT (F2 review): certificate is per-tenant, matching series (already
tenant-scoped) and the GET/DELETE anti-oracle boundary. Emission's
_get_live_certificate and the upload-replace pre-check (certificates.
service, renamed _get_live_certificate_by_branch ->
_get_live_certificate_by_tenant_branch) both omitted tenant_ref -- two
tenants of one product reusing branch_ref="matriz" collapsed onto the same
slot: B's upload soft-deleted A's still-live certificate, and A's emission
went on to sign with B's certificate.
Migration 8f1a2c9d4b6e replaces the partial-unique index
ix_fiscal_certificates_product_branch_live with
ix_fiscal_certificates_product_tenant_branch_live on
(product_id, tenant_ref, branch_ref) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL, with a
working downgrade. Upload's two-layer defense (pre-check + IntegrityError ->
CertificateUploadConflictError) still holds against the new index.
Tests:
- tests/emission/test_emissao.py::
test_dois_tenants_do_mesmo_produto_reusando_branch_ref_tem_certificados_isolados
-- two tenants upload for the same product/branch_ref, both stay live;
emission for each signs with its OWN certificate (observable via FIX 1's
CNPJ check: without FIX 2, tenant A's emission would 409
emitente_certificate_cnpj_mismatch because the "live" cert would
actually be B's).
- tests/migrations/test_fiscal_documents_schema.py::
test_two_tenants_can_both_hold_a_live_certificate_for_the_same_branch_ref_on_real_migration
-- real alembic upgrade head, raw INSERTs proving both tenants' certs
land live.
- tests/migrations/test_fiscal_documents_schema.py::
test_two_live_certificates_for_same_product_tenant_branch_violate_unique_index_on_real_migration
(renamed from ..._product_branch_...) -- same (product, tenant, branch)
still rejects a second live certificate on the real migration.
- tests/certificates/test_certificates.py::
test_concurrent_uploads_for_same_product_branch_only_one_wins_the_other_gets_409
updated for the renamed/re-scoped precheck function (still same-tenant
race, still 1 winner + 1 CertificateUploadConflictError).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports the three tables that change owner per the design spec (decision #2):
FiscalSeries (was tenants.FiscalDocumentSeries), FiscalCertificate,
FiscalDocument (both from fiscal.models) — organization_id/branch_id
replaced by product_id (FK products) + tenant_ref/branch_ref (opaque
strings) per the porte table. sale_id/service_order_id dropped (no Sale
concept here). document_model is now a plain String(2) + Python enum,
never a Postgres enum (Global Constraints: zero enum PG — the auto's own
version of this column was a real PG enum, a documented debt not repeated
here).
Constraints preserved: UNIQUE chave_acesso, partial-unique
cert-vivo-per-(product_id, branch_ref) (product-scoped in addition to the
auto's branch_id, since branch_ref is an opaque string two different
products could coincidentally share), UNIQUE (product_id, tenant_ref,
branch_ref, document_model, serie) on the series.
documents.service.allocate_fiscal_number ported verbatim (mechanism +
contract): SELECT ... FOR UPDATE + populate_existing=True, no-commit
contract (caller commits together with the FiscalDocument insert, Task 5).
The next_number regression guard is deliberately deferred to Task 4's
PATCH /v1/series endpoint (needs FiscalDocument, which now exists).
AST guard (tests/shared/test_for_update_populate_existing.py) ported and
adapted to scan src/fiscal_svc/, plus two new self-tests proving the
detection logic itself in both directions (flags a missing fix, does not
false-positive on a correctly fixed multi-line chain) — the ported guard
alone only proves "currently green", not "actually detects".
33 tests green via `make k8s-test` (real-migration round trips + unique
constraint violations, N=10 concurrency, identity-map staleness repro,
tenancy-scoping not-found across product/tenant_ref/branch_ref).
Product is the only tenant table this service owns (porte table:
organization_id -> product_id, everything below it -- tenant_ref/
branch_ref -- stays an opaque string owned by the consuming product, never
a row here). Bcrypt-hashed API keys (passlib, same CryptContext shape as
the auto's auth.service), generated once by scripts/create_product.py and
never persisted in the clear. require_product (X-Api-Key -> Product, 401
on missing/wrong/soft-deleted) is the porte adaptation of the auto's
require_permission — every /v1/* route will depend on it instead of a JWT
bearer token.
Also ports shared/base_model.py and shared/errors.py verbatim (Global
Constraints: soft delete mixins, structured 409 bodies).
products migration + real "alembic upgrade head" round-trip test
(tests/migrations/, new shared _helpers.py instead of the auto's ad hoc
cross-file _run_psql reuse). 13 tests green via `make k8s-test`.
